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Labor Law-Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers: The
End to the Erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act1 divests the federal courts
of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in connection with labor disputes.
This Act was passed in 1933 to foster the growth and viability of the
then nascent labor movement.2 It has been gradually eroded by the
courts over the years, chiefly as a result of the Act's success in achiev-
ing its goals.' The enormous growth of organized labor following the
passage of the Act has rendered the policies of the Act obsolete and
out of step with modern conditions. The Supreme Court has reacted
to this situation by "accommodating" the anti-injunction provision of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to allow an injunction to issue in certain situa-
tions. The most controversial of these accommodations has been the
issuance of an injunction to force a union to honor its contractual obliga-
tion not to strike over an issue subject to mandatory arbitration.4 The
extent of this "accommodation" has produced considerable confusion
in the circuit courts when applied to the sympathy strike,5 where the
arbitrable issue is not the cause of the strike but its legality. 6 In
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,7 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the sympathy strike
1. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or in-
terested in such dispute. . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment ....
2. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970) declares the public policy of the United States in labor
matters. Basically this section states that employees should be free from restraint in
designating their representatives and in engaging in "concerted activities," e.g., strikes.
3. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures show that the number of strikes doubled
from 841 per year in 1932 to 1,695 in 1933, the year the Norris-LaGuardia Act became
law. By 1944-1946, the average number of strikes per yeai was over 4,500. Causes of
Strikes in 1946, 19 L.R.R.M. 49-50 (1946).
4. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
5. A sympathy strike involves two unions; one is striking to force some concession
from the employer, the other strikes in sympathy with the first's objectives. Sympathy
strikes are a common manifestation of traditional union solidarity. As stated by one
commentator, "Observance of a picket line-any picket line-is venerated as a funda-
mental tenet of union morality." Haggard, Picket Line Observance as a Protected Con-
certed Activity, 53 N.C.L. REv. 43, 43 (1974).
6. See text accompanying note 84 infra.
7. 96S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
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situation, giving notice that the judiciary's forty-year erosion of the Act
may be at an end.
I. THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
Prior to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the federal judi-
ciary was often a willing tool of management in their battle against the
rise of the labor union.8 Injunctions were issued rather indiscrimi-
nately, usually at ex parte hearings, based solely on the judge's notions
of the propriety of the strike's objectives and methods of achieving
them. 9
The Supreme Court endorsed the narrow view of permissible
strike objectives in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell."0  The
United Mine Workers had organized the coal mines in Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania, but not in West Virginia. Since labor costs were a large factor in
coal prices, only by organizing the Vest Virginia mines could those mines
be prevented from cutting wages below the union scale and thereby
taking business from the unionized mines. Hitchman, however, had
extracted a pledge from its employees not to join a union. In order
to evade this pledge the UMW advised the Hitchman employees to join
the union but to keep their membership secret. When enough employ-
ees had joined the union, a strike was called. The Supreme Court held
that there was no justification for the UMW's activities because that
union had no interest in the Hitchman employees' working conditions.,
Without proper justification, the UMW support of the strike was held
enjoinable. 12
The use of the labor injunction in this manner effectively deprived
the unions of the opportunity to organize the mines or other industries.
So long as there was a competing non-union mine or factory the
8. See generally F. FRNKFuRTER & N. GRrEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
9. Strikes were usually enjoined as tortious if the union could not "justify" the
strike. Justification was to be found in the purpose of the injury the strike inflicted
upon the employer and the means by which it was inflicted. A proper purpose was the
desire to achieve direct and obvious benefits such as higher wages and shorter hours.
More remote purposes, such as strengthening the union or inducing another worker to
strike, were prohibited. Peaceful picketing was a legitimate means to achieve a lawful
purpose, but picketing could not be accompanied by even a taint of violence. Given
the industrial climate of the early twentieth century and the presumption of many courts
that picketing was always accompanied with violence, picketing as a legitimate means
was hard to prove. Courts thus found it easy to characterize the purpose or the means
of striking as illegal and therefore enjoinable. See id. at 24-46.
10. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
11. Id. at 252-53.
12. Id. at 260.
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rationale of Hitchman and the resulting availability of the injunction
made it difficult to win wage increases. Consequently, at the depth
of the Great Depression, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
deprive management of the labor injunction."3 Section 4 protected
union organization, picketing, striking and boycotts from restraint by in-
junction regardless of objective. 14  Sections 7 and 8 required additional
procedures 15 and the exhaustion of alternative remedies16 before an in-
junction could issue even to protect an employer's property. The
Norris-LaGuardia Act in effect allowed the free interplay of economic
forces in labor disputes. It was hoped that this freedom would result
in the improvement of the working man's earnings and working condi-
tions.17
11. THE FIRST ACCOMMODATION:
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The denial of jurisdiction to issue injunctions did not last very long
in its original form. In 1937, in Virginian Railway v. System Federa-
tion No. 40,18 an injunction was issued to require a railroad company
to "treat with" the authorized representative of its employees in accord-
ance with the statutory requirements of the Railway Labor Act. 9 The
13. 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1970). The attitude of Congress in enacting this legis-
lation is expressed in the following statement of Senator Norris: "It is because we have
now on the bench some judges-and undoubtedly we will have others-who lack that
judicial poise necessary in passing upon the disputes between labor and capital that
[an anti-injunction law] is necessary." 75 CONG. REc. 4510 (1932). Such an opinion
was well based. Out of 118 applications for federal labor injunctions between 1900
and 1927, 70 were issued ex parte, and only 12 of these were supported by affidavits;
during this period only 9 injunctions were denied. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREN, supra
note 8, at 64.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
15. Id. § 107.
16. Id. § 108.
17. The Supreme Court has defined the central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to be the encouragement of the "growth and viability of labor organizations." Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970).
18. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
19. 45 U.S.C. H§ 151-163 (1970). The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926
to regulate railway management-labor disputes with a minimum of government interfer-
ence. Note, Labor Law-Railway Labor Act--"Every Reasonable Effort" Requirement
of Railway Labor Act, Section 2, First, Held to be Judicially Enforceable, 17 VIL. L.
REV. 766, 768 n.16 (1972). The Railway Labor Act created affirmative legal duties
on the part of the carriers and the railway unions to "exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements," 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1970), and also established
the mechanisms for dispute settlement through conferences, id., Second & Sixth. If
the conferences failed to achieve settlement, the Act provided for submission to boards
of adjustment, id. § 153. Finally, the 1926 Act expanded the voluntary arbitration pro-
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Court brushed aside the employer's contention that section 9 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act barred such an injunction20 by emphasizing that
the purpose of the Act was to protect the employee's right to organize
and strike.21  But the Court went further and added: "[The provisions
of the Railway Labor Act] cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier
and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 22
Twelve years later in Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen,28 the
Supreme Court expanded Virginian Railway, declaring that an injunc-
tion could issue despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act in order to enforce
the statutory duty that the Railway Labor Act imposed upon a railway
labor union to represent all its members without discrimination. As
justification for ignoring the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Graham Court
quoted language from an earlier railway labor opinion stating that with-
out an injunction, the aggrieved union members would have a statutory
right without a remedy.24
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River and
Indiana Railroad,2 5 the Court continued the process begun in Virginian
Railway to almost totally negate the Norris-LaGuardia Act when it
cedures already in existence. Id. §§ 157-159.
In 1934 the Act was amended to impose a new duty on the employer to "treat with"
the employees' certified representatives. Id. § 152, Ninth. The 1934 amendments also
created the National Railroad Adjustment Board to settle disputes concerning the inter-
pretation of collective bargaining contracts. Id. § 153. See International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 756-760 (1961).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1970) provides in part:
[Elvery restraining order or injunction in a case involving or growing out of
a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition of such specific act or acts as
may be expressly complained of in the bill of complaint or petition filed in
such case and as shall be expressly included in ...findings of fact made and
filed by the court ....
The employer asserted that the decree in Virginian Ry. did not conform to these require-
ments. 300 U.S. at 562.
21. 300 U.S. at 563.
22. Id.
23. 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
24. Id. at 239. The Court's justification appears inadequate. The language quoted
by the Court appeared in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944),
which did not even mention the Norris-LaGuardia Act: The right of fair representation
"would be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without the remedy which courts can give
for breach of such a duty or obligation and which it is their duty to give in cases in
which they have jurisdiction." Id. at 207 (emphasis added). The point apparently
overlooked is that the Norris-LaGuardia Act divests the federal courts of injunctive juris-
diction.
Further, the Graham Court made the rather spurious remark that the Norris-La-
Guardia Act does not "contain anything to suggest that it would deprive these Negro
firemen of recourse to equitable relief." 338 U.S. at 239. Since the Court had just
held the dispute in Graham was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the plain language of that Act contradicts this statement.
25. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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comes in conflict with the Railway Labor Act. In a carefully reasoned
opinion, the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act could not be
read in isolation: "There must be an accommodation of [the Norris-
LaGuardia Act] and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose
of each is preserved."2  The Court decided that section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed to "prevent the injunctions of the
federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the competing
economic forces of labor and capital," and that the Railway Labor Act
was enacted to channel "these economic forces . . . into special
processes intended to compromise them. 217 The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that railway labor controversies "are not the same as those in
which the injunction strips labor of its primary weapon without substi-
tuting any reasonable alternative." 2s Thus, in Chicago River and Indi-
ana Railroad the Court declared an accommodation between these two
statutes, reasoning that since arbitration is statutorily required in the rail-
way labor context for certain disputes, an injunction does not foreclose
a union victory on the issue that precipitated the strike and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act does not apply. The Court seemed to imply that only
if the union had a reasonable alternative to striking as a means to
achieve its desired result could an injunction issue despite the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
If this was the implication intended by the Court, it was altered
somewhat in International Association of Machinists v. Street.29 There
the Supreme 'Court considered whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act pro-
hibited an injunction to force a union to cease expending union funds
for political purposes in violation of the Railway Labor Act. Noting
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act "does not deprive the federal courts of
jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with various mandates of the Railway
Labor Act," the Court held that "the policy of the [Norris-LaGuardia]
Act suggests that the courts should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive
remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that
remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right."30 Street did
not involve an injunction to end a strike, but Street and Chicago River
and Indiana Railroad taken together seem to produce the rule that an
26. Id. at 40.
27. Id. at 40, 41.
28. Id. at 41. The Norris-LaGuardia Act does apply to "major" railway labor dis-
putes, because the Railway Labor Act provides a mechanism for the resolution of only,
"minor" disputes. Id. at 42 n.24.
29. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
30. Id. at 772, 773.
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injunction can issue to end a strike only if there is a reasonable alterna-
tive to striking and there is no other effective remedy.
This rule apparently met its demise in Chicago & North Western
Railway v. United Transportation Union,31 where the Court again con-
stricted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the railway labor context by en-
joining a threatened strike which in effect forced the union to comply
with its statutory duty under section 2, First, of the Railway Labor Act
to "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements."' 2
In this case there was no reasonable alternative (other than negotia-
tion) to the "primary weapon" of the union to force concessions on the
issue underlying its dispute with the employer. Despite this, the in-
junction was declared an appropriate remedy based on the need to
accommodate the Railway Labor Act with the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Thus, in the field of railway labor relations, if the union has
violated a statutory duty and the injunction is the only effective remedy
for that breach, an injunction may issue even though this may deprive
the union of any method to achieve its result other than through nego-
tiation. This deprivation seems to be squarely within the policies of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the Court appeared to recognize this by
stating that "the vagueness of the obligation under § 2 First [of the
Railway Labor Act] could provide a cover for freewheeling judicial in-
terference in labor relations of the sort that called forth the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in the first place. '3 3 To minimize this danger, the
Court counseled restraint in the issuance of such injunctions.84
IH. A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS: THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Until Buffalo Forge, with one exception835 the Court had exercised
little restraint in restricting the Norris-LaGuardia Act when it conflicted
with another, more comprehensive labor statute, section 301 (a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act,3 6 passed in 1947. Section 301 (a) was passed partly
as a result of the success of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and other statutes
in fostering the growth of labor unions. 1 The rise of organized labor
31. 402 U.S. 570 (1970).
32. Id. at 583. The Court's action here was similar to that of the NLRB when
it finds a violation of § 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(3) (1970). Thus, Chicago & North Western Ry. was effectively the judicial
creation of the § 8(b) (3) remedy in the railway labor context.
33. 402 U.S. at 583.
34. Id.
35. See text accompanying notes 48-53 infra.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
37. Between 1935 and 1947 organized workers grew from four million to over four-
teen million. A. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LAOR PoLICY 12 (1960).
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created a shift in Congressional emphasis away from the protection of
labor to the encouragement of the peaceful settlement of labor disputes
and the protection of contractual rights under collective bargaining
agreements.88
Most labor contracts had provisions for the peaceful settlement of
contractual disputes through the use of arbitration. 39 However, unions
often failed to live up to their contractual obligations to submit disputes
to arbitration rather than to strike over them. Due to the status of
unions as unincorporated associations, employers in many states had
difficulty suing the union for such breaches of contract. Some states
required service of all members of the union, while in others the union
was viewed as an agent acting for the benefit of the workers and thus
did not possess any rights or obligations as an entity.40  On the other
hand, if the employer breached he normally could be easily sued.
To remedy this disparity, 41 Congress sought to make the
obligations of the collective bargaining contract mutually binding and
enforceable in the federal courts by enacting section 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organ-
izations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 42
The avowed purpose of the statute was to "provide for suits by unions
as legal entities and against unions as legal entities in the Federal
Courts in disputes affecting commerce. 43
38. "The Taft-Hartley Act ... was enacted in 1947 as the product of ... an un-
happy union between the opponents of all collective bargaining and the critics of the
abuse of union power." Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). This rise in power produced a
congressional emphasis on the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. 29
U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970) declared the public policy of the United States to be the en-
couragement of arbitration.
39. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL.
L. REv. 663, 755-760 (1973).
40. See generally Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33
YALE L.J. 383 (1924); Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private
Associations, 76 Htnv. L. Rnv. 983, 1080-87 (1963).
41. The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act and some of the reasons behind
its passage are contained in the appendix to Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485 app. (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
43. SENATE REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947). The Taft-Hartley Act
1977] 1253
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In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,4" an action by a union
seeking to enjoin an employer from refusing to submit a dispute to arbi-
tration as required by their contract, the Supreme Court relied on the
congressionally expressed policy of promoting the enforceability of
labor contracts to interpret section 301(a) to be more than a mere juris-
dictional statute. Reasoning that the employer's agreement to arbitrate
is the quid pro quo of the union's agreement not to strike, the Court
decided that Congress had adopted the policy of providing sanctions for
the violation of an agreement to arbitrate disputes.45  The Court
further held that the sanctions to be imposed under section 301(a)
were to be governed by the federal common law of labor relations,
"which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws." 4 6 Clearly, by granting jurisdiction to the federal courts for suits
on collective bargaining agreements, the anti-injunction provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act were brought into question. To avoid these
provisions the Court relied on cases construing the Railway Labor
Act, but not on the "peculiarities" of that Act, to find that the policies
of Norris-LaGuardia did not support a literal reading of section 7 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.4r Thus an injunction could issue to force
an employer to arbitrate in accordance with his contractual obligations.
The erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was temporarily halted
in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson.48 In Sinclair the policies of the
Taft-Hartley Act in favor of the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements met head-on with the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Sinclair involved a collective bargaining agree-
ment that included an arbitration agreement and an express no-strike
clause. Ignoring this clause, the union had "over a period of some 19
months, engaged in work stoppages and strikes on nine separate
occasions, each of which. . . grew out of a grievance which could have
been submitted to arbitration under the contract . . . ,, 4 Despite
repealed parts of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by making certain strikes illegal, i.e., second-
ary and national emergency strikes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 178(b), 160(h) (1970).
44. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
45. Id. at 456.
46. Id.'
47. Id. at 458. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970) requires that certain procedures be fol.
lowed before any labor injunction may be issued, even against management.
48. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
49. Id. at 197. The statutory protection afforded a worker who honors a picket
line, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970), had previously been held waivable by union
agreement to a no-strike clause. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71
(1953).
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statutes50 and judicial decisions51 which clearly expressed a preference
for arbitration as the means to resolve industrial disputes, the Court in
Sinclair found the language of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
"almost if not entirely conclusive"52 and the congressional intent
underlying it "crystal clear": 3 the federal courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to enjoin a union from striking even if it had previously agreed
to settle by binding arbitration the dispute which led to the strike.
Although the lower federal courts construed Sinclair rather nar-
rowly,54 the decision nonetheless made only one-half of the quid pro
quo of the collective bargaining agreement specifically enforceable:55
the employer could be ordered to arbitrate but the employees could
not be ordered back to work. The immediate effect of this situation
was that, when state law permitted, an employer who was struck in vio-
lation of his collective bargaining contract would seek an injunction in
state court rather than in federal court.
This tactic was possible because it had previously been held in
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney56 that section 301(a) did not divest
the state courts of jurisdiction to hear suits for violation of collective
bargaining agreements. Even though the Supreme Court had also held
in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 57 that in such suits the law
50. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 108, 173(d) (1970).
51. Three cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy express the Supreme Court's
preference for arbitration. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
52. 370 U.S. at 204.
53. Id. at 215.
54. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389
F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968), and Philadelphia Marine Trade
Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local 1291, 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64 (1967), both held that Sinclair did not prohibit an injunc-
tion to enforce an arbitrator's decision after it was entered. See Keene, The Supreme
Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond,
15 VILL. L. REV. 32 (1969). Buffalo Forge explicitly adopted this position: "[Rlele-
vant federal statutes as construed in our cases would permit an injunction to enforce the
arbitral decision." 96 S. Ct. at 3146.
55. One commentator has stated that the arbitration clause is truly the quid pro
quo of the no-strike clause only in those agreements in which the union agrees not to
strike over issues which are specifically included in the arbitration clause and the union
has preserved the right to strike over issues which are not within the arbitrator's domain.
Such contracts are rare. Since most collective bargaining contracts do not contain all
the rules governing the employee-employer relationship, "the no-strike provisions of most
collective agreements constitutes a quo considerably in excess of the quid of the agree-
ment to arbitrate." Feller, supra note 39, at 760.
56. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
57. 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Lucas Flour is also significant because the Court af-
firmed the award of damages to an employer based on a no-strike clause implied solely
on the basis of a mandatory arbitration provision. See id. at 105.
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to be applied was federal rather than state law, the Dowd Box Court
had expressly left open the question whether the constraints of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to the state courts.58 Thus it was natural
for state judges to interpret the Norris-LaGuardia Act so as not to apply
to them.59 Once the state court issued the injunction, however, the
union would attempt to remove the case to federal court, e0 where it
would argue that injunctive relief was barred under Sinclair and request
the district court to dissolve the injunction.61  The employer's tactic,
on the other hand, would be to seek only an injunction in state court,
and attempt to defeat removal by asserting that section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act removed federal jurisdiction for injunctive cases. 2
The union's approach won express approval in Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 735.03 The Avco decision epitomized the conflict that had
been simmering in federal labor law since Lincoln Mills. In Lincoln
Mills the Court had declared section 301 (a) to have a substantive con-
tent which the lower federal courts were instructed to fashion from the
policies of the national labor laws. These policies were: (1) to enhance
the enforceability of collective bargaining contracts; 4 (2) to promote
uniformity between state and federal courts; 6 and (3) to expand the
number of courts available to hear collective bargaining contract
58. 368 U.S. at 514 n.8. Actually, the Court left two questions open in Dowd
Box: "whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act might be applicable to suit brought in a state
court for violation of contract made by a labor organization, and whether there might
be impediments to the free removal to a federal court of such a suit." Both questions
were answered in the negative, the first in William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974), and the second in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,
390 U.S. 557 (1968).
59. The leading state court case on the issue was McCarrol v. Los Angeles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957). McCarrol was cited
with approval in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,
247 (1970), and in William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12,
20 (1974). As stated by Justice Traynor: "[W]hether or not Congress could deprive
state courts of the power to [grant injunctions] when enforcing collective bargaining
agreements, it has not attempted to do so either in the Norris-LaGuardia Act or section
301." 49 Cal. 2d at 63, 315 P.2d at 332.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b) (1970) allow removal.
61. Id. § 1450 authorizes the district court to dissolve state court injunctions after
removal.
62. This argument was accepted in American Dredging Co. v. Operating Eng'rs
Local 25, 338. F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
63. 390 U.S. 557 (1967).
64. The conclusion that § 301(a) was intended to encourage the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements is found in Lincoln Mills itself: "The congressional
policy in favor of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes [is]
clear. . . ." 353 U.S. at 458-59.
65. The policy of uniformity is found in Lucas Flour: "[T]he subject matter of
§ 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.'" 369 U.S. at 103.
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cases.0 6 But Avco allowed removal to the federal courts, where even
a state court injunction could not stand. Through this route of removal
unions were effectively divesting state courts of jurisdiction to hear col-
lective bargaining cases. On the other hand, if the state courts were
found to be bound by the anti-injunction prohibitions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, then the policies favoring uniformity and expanding the
number of forums would be enhanced, but the conflicting policy of
making collective bargaining contracts enforceable would be frustrated.
There would be no forum in which an employer could get specific per-
formance of his contract.
This conflict could be eliminated through the reversal of Sinclair.
By allowing the federal courts to issue labor injunctions, federal and
state courts would have the same arsenal of remedies. There would
no longer be an incentive for the union to remove a case to federal
court, and the employer could get his collective bargaining contract en-
forced. Justice Stewart indicated that the reversal of Sinclair was on
his mind when he stated in his concurrence in Avco that on an appro-
priate occasion the Court would review the "scope and continuing
validity of Sinclair.' '6 7
IV. THE SECOND ACCOMODATION:
Boys MARKETS, INC. V. RETAIL CLERKS UNION
The promised review of Sinclair resulted in its reversal in 1970,
in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770.5 Boys
Markets involved a collective bargaining agreement that contained a
provision for the compulsory arbitration of all disputes concerning the
interpretation of the agreement and a clause specifying that there would
be "no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts."6 9
When a dispute arose concerning work assignments, the union called
a strike despite its agreement to resolve such disputes by arbitration.
The Supreme Court authorized the use of an injunction in this case,
reasoning that an accommodation between the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and section 301(a) was necessary to preserve the policies of each. 70
66. In Dowd Box, the Court stated in regard to § 301: "Congress expressly in-
tended not to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction of the state courts." 368 U.S. at
509.
67. 390 U.S. at 562 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
69. Id. at 239.
70. Id. at 250, 253.
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In reaching this accommodation, the Court noted that two of the
policies of federal labor law, uniformity between, and concurrent juris-
diction of, state and federal courts could be furthered by simply extend-
ing Sinclair to the state courts.71 But extending Sinclair to the state
courts, besides raising constitutional problems, would seriously under-
cut" 'the central institution in the administration of collective bargaining
contracts' "-arbitration.7 2  Without the injunctive remedy, reasoned
the Court, employers would be reticent to enter into arbitration agree-
ments. 3  But the Court did not rely exclusively on this argument:
"Even if management is not encouraged by the unavailability of the
injunction remedy to resist arbitration agreements, the fact remains that
the effectiveness of such agreements would be greatly reduced if injunc-
tive relief were withheld" because the "basic purpose" of arbitration
agreements is to cut down on the use of economic force in labor dis-
putes.74
The accommodation made in Boys Markets was permissible, said
the Court, because of a congressional shift in emphasis between the
passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act. This shift in emphasis from the "protection of the nascent
labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining and
[arbitration] . . . was accomplished . . . without extensive revision of
. . . the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus it became the task of the courts
to accomodate the older [statute] with the more recent [one]. 17 As
a prior example of such an accommodation, the Court cited Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River and Indiana Railroad.7 0
But the Court discounted the significance of the Railway Labor Act's
statutory arbitration procedures, thereby raising the voluntary agree-
ment to arbitrate to a level sufficient to invoke the accommodation
process limiting specific statutory language.7 7  As a final touch to the
Boys Markets accommodation, the Court stated that "a remedial device
71. Id. -at 247.
72. Id. at 252 (quoting Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the
Political Process:" A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1557 (1963)).
73. Id. at 248.
74. Id. at 249.
75. Id. at 251.
76. 353 U.S. 30 (1P57); see text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
77. In Boys Markets, as in Chicago River & Ind. R.R., there was a mandatory
"reasonable alternative" to striking, i.e., arbitration. Moreover, unlike International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), there was no other reasonable
alternative remedy available, since the Court decided that "an award of damages after a
dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike." 398
U.S. at 248.
The conclusion that damages are an inadequate remedy for a strike in violation of
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that merely enforces the obligation that the union freely undertook"
actually advances, rather than retards, the goal of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act "to foster the growth and viability of labor organizations. 78
After reciting these policy considerations, the Court specifically
limited the Boys Markets holding. The accommodation was described
as a "narrow" exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act that did not affect
the Act's "vitality. '79 Additionally, the opinion stated that a Boys
Markets injunction could issue only when there is a mandatory arbitra-
tion provision within a valid collective bargaining contract.8 0  "Prin-
ciples of guidance" were then set out to be followed in determining
when a Boys Markets injunction should issue: "'When a strike is
sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties
are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no in-
junctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that
effect.' "81
V. Boys MARKETS AND THE SYMPATHY STRIKE
Although these guidelines are fairly clear when applied to the
situation present in Boys Markets-when the union strikes over an
issue it had previously agreed to arbitrate-in another fairly common
industrial fact situation, the sympathy strike, the result is not so clear.
In the typical sympathy strike, the union and the employer have
a valid collective bargaining contract with th6 standard quid pro quo:
the union has agreed to refrain from striking for the duration of the
a collective bargaining agreement is a recurrent theme in cases and commentary concern-
ing Sinclair and Boys Markets. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968,
973 (3d Cir. 1972); ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAW SECTION, REPORT OF SPECIAL ATImN-
SoN-SINCLAIR COMM. 226, 242 (1963), quoted in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 n. 17 (1970). However, at least one commentator
questions this conclusion: "Mhose who believe that exposure to a damage judgment
does not operate as a significant deterrent have little experience with the decision-mak-
ing process on the union side." Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA.
L. REv. 427, 465 (1969). If one accepts this statement, then it arguably follows that
"[i]t is . . . doubtful that relieving the vexation of the breach-of-contract strike in the
individual case is worth the risk of even a limited intrusion of the strike injunction" in
contravention of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. Thus, if the damage remedy is ade-
quate in the sense that its existence operates to induce unions to honor their contracts,
then Boys Markets is wrongly decided, because the damage remedy alone is sufficient
(so the argument goes) to uphold the policy of the federal labor law favoring arbitration.
78. 398 U.S. at 252.
79. Id. at 253.
80. See id. ("We deal only with the situation in which a collective-bargaining con-
tract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure.")
81. Id. at 254 (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228
(1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in original).
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agreement, while the employer has agreed to arbitrate any dispute con-
cerning the application of the agreement. If the employer has a labor
dispute with another union not a party to this agreement, the other
union may place pickets at the gates used by the contractually bound
union members . 2  In such a situation, the contractually bound union
would usually claim that the no-strike clause was not applicable to the
honoring of another union's picket line. The union would typically
argue that since it was simply honoring a sister union's picket line, the
strike was not "over" an arbitrable dispute, thus Boys Markets by its
very language83 does not apply, and no injunction could issue. To
counter this argument, the employer commonly would emphasize that
the question of the strike's legality was for the arbitrator, since it was
his task to interpret the scope of the no-strike clause. Also, the em-
ployer would argue that given the strong preference for arbitration ex-
pressed in Boys Markets, an injunction should issue pending the arbi-
trator's decision. The basic distinction between the two positions is that
the union argues that Boys Markets is applicable only when a strike
evolves from an arbitrable dispute, while the employer argues that if
the strike produces an arbitrable dispute a Boys Markets injunction can
issue pending the arbitrator's decision.84
The Supreme Court gave solace to the employer's position in its
first decision construing Boys Markets-Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW.8"
Gateway Coal involved an employer's request for an injunction to end
a strike caused by a safety dispute. Whereas in Boys Markets there
was only one real issue-the arbitrable question whether the employ-
er's work assignment violated the contract-in Gateway Coal there were
two. The first was similar to the one in Boys Markets: an arbitrable
82. To be legal, this picketing must not be "secondary" or it would be enjoinable
under the Labor Management Relations Act §§ 8(b)(4)(B) and 10(l), 29 U.S.C. §§
158(b)(4)(B), 160(l) (1970). If the employer has common control of both unions'
working facilities, the picketing (that induces the contract-bound union not to go to
work) is "primary" and is thus clearly within the protection of § 4 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. Occasionally, the collective bargaining contract in question will have a
no-strike clause that makes an express exception for the honoring of primary picket
lines. In such a situation the arbitrable dispute is whether the picket line being honored
is primary or secondary. As in the more typical situation, the sympathy strike produces
the arbitrable issue rather than evolves from it. See, e.g., NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1049 (1974).
83. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
84. Note, Labor Law-Inunctions-Boycotts and Strikes-Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act Bars Federal Court Injunction Against Strike Not Over an Arbitrable
Grievance, 44 U. CiNN. L. REv. 836, 841 (1975).
85. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
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dispute concerning the contractual validity of the employer's decision
to retain two foremen who had falsified safety records. Under Boys
Markets, if this were the only issue, a strike to force the employer to
dismiss the foremen would have clearly been enjoinable.86 But in
Gateway Coal there was a second dispute concerning the proper con-
struction of another clause in the collective bargaining agreement that
the union claimed gave it the right to close the mine despite its implied
no-strike pledge.87  Only by engaging in extensive contractual analysis
concerning the applicability of an exception to the implied no-strike
pledge could the Court find the strike illegal and thus enjoinable. Based
on its finding that the exception's procedures had not been followed,
the Court authorized the injunction pending the arbitrator's resolution
of the same contractual issue. 8
Thus, after Gateway Coal it was possible for the employer to argue
that the "over" an arbitrable grievance language in Boys Markets was
not an essential ingredient of a Boys Markets injunction. Since Gate-
way Coal had authorized an injunction pending the arbitrator's decision
concerning the legality of the strike, it was arguable that a sympathy
strike could be enjoined pending resolution of the arbitrable question
of its legality. Indeed, the view that a sympathy strike could be en-
joined pending the arbitrator's decision concerning its legality was
86. Safety disputes were not mentioned in the arbitration clause but the Court con-
cluded that the "presumption of arbitrability" announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy,
supra note 51, worked to include the safety dispute in the arbitration clause. 414 U.S.
at 377-78.
In Boys Markets the no-strike clause was extremely clear and did not involve a real
question of contractual interpretation. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S.
Ct. 3141, 3146 (1976).
87. The Court found an implied no-strike pledge based on the express arbitration
clause in the collective bargaining contract. Although the Court recognized that a col-
lective bargaining agreement could expressly negative a no-strike clause, it was held that
"[aibsent an explicit expression of such an intention. . . the agreement to arbitrate and
the duty not to strike should be construed as having coterminous application." 414 U.S.
at 382. In addition to finding the implied no-strike duty, the Court went further and
interpreted another clause that expressly provided for a procedure whereby the union
could close the mine due to adverse safety conditions. The Court found that this clause
did not limit the presumptive application of the arbitration clause and thus safety dis-
putes were arbitrable. Id. at 380 n.10. The Court also found that the safety clause,
as applied in this case, did not affect the implied no-strike clause. Id. at 383-84.
88. Id. at 387. The Court's entry into substantive contractual interpretation was
questionable given the arbitrator's authority under the contract to answer such questions.
The propriety of this invasion into the arbitrator's domain is rendered even more suspect
in view of the fact that the arbitrator subsequently implied that the safety grievance pro-
cedure to close the mine had been properly invoked, even though he held that the deci-
sion to close the mine was arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 51a app. G, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
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adopted by the Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits. 80 The view was typi-
cally stated in Valmac Industries, Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425:0
"It makes little sense to argue that because the work stoppage precipi-
tated the dispute it was not a work stoppage 'over' a grievance which
the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate.""1
Notwithstanding this view, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits placed
great emphasis on the "over a grievance" language02 The leading
opinion of this school of thought was Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters.9 3 There the Fifth Circuit held that when a strike is not
over an arbitrable grievance (as in the sympathy strike context) no in-
junction could issue despite a violation of the clear language of the no-
strike clause. The Amstar court reasoned that "[w]ere we to hold
that the legality of the very strike sought to be enjoined in the present
situation constituted a sufficiently arbitrable underlying dispute for a
Boys Markets injunction to issue, it is difficult to conceive of any strike
which could not be so enjoined. '9 4  The Second Circuit adopted this
position in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers9 and the
Supreme Court affirmed in a landmark labor decision.90
VI. BUFFALO FORGE, Co. V. UNITED STEELWORKERS
The Buffalo Forge sympathy strike arose in the typical fashion.
The employer, Buffalo Forge Co., operated three plants whose Produc-
tion and Maintenance (P & M) employees were represented by two
locals of the United Steelworkers. The P & M employees were bound
under two contracts with identical no-strike and arbitration clauses. 7
89. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. International Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 72 (1976); Armco Steel
Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975);
NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1975).
90. 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 3215 (1976).
91. Id. at 267.
92. See, e.g., Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No.
53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976) (cert. denied
same day as Buffalo Forge announced); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
93. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
94. Id. at 1373.
95. 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
96. 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
97. The no-strike clause of each agreement provided:
'"There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of
work. No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate,
aid or condone any such activities. No employee shall participate in any such
activity. The 'Union recognizes its possible liabilities for violation of this pro.
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Shortly before the dispute between the P & M workers and Buffalo
Forge arose, the United Steelworkers were certified to represent
Buffalo Forge's office clerical-technical (0 & T) employees, who were
not covered by the collective bargaining agreements already in force.
Unable to reach an agreement with management, the 0 & T employees
struck and established pickets at all three Buffalo Forge facilities. The
P & M employees honored these lines and production halted. Buffalo
Forge requested an injunction to force the P & M employees back to
work. 98  The district court construed Boys Markets to be inapplicable
to this situation and refused to issue the injunction. 9 The Second
Circuit affirmed. 100
Justice White, writing for the majority in this five to four deci-
sion,101 began his analysis by noting that there was no dispute that the
cause of the strike was not an arbitrable issue.10 2  Further, the parties
were in agreement that the employer could invoke the arbitration
clause to submit the question of the strike's legality to the arbitrator,
who would decide upon the appropriate remedy if the no-strike clause
vision and will use its influence to see that work stoppages are prevented. Un-
successful efforts by Union officers or Union representatives to prevent and
terminate conduct prohibited by this paragraph, will not be construed as 'aid'
or 'condonation' of such conduct and shall not result in any disciplinary actions
against the Officer, committeemen or stewards involved."
Id. at 3143 n.1. The identical arbitration clauses provided:
"Should differences arise between the [employer] and any employee cov-
ered by this Agreement as to the meaning and application of the provisions
of this Agreement, or should any trouble of any kind arise in the plant, there
shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences, but an earnest
effort shall be made to settle such differences immediately [under the six-step
grievance and arbitration procedure provided in [the Agreement]]."
Id. at 3143-44. The final step of the six-step grievance procedure provided for a bi-
lateral arbitration clause:
"In the event the grievance involves a question as to the meaning and appli-
cation of the provisions of this Agreement, and has not been previously satis-
factorily resolved, it may be submitted to arbitration upon written notice of the
Union or the Company."
Id. at 3144 n.2. At least one district court sought to limit the applicability of Boys
Markets if the arbitration clause could be invoked by only the union. Stroehmann Bros.
Co. v. Local 427, Confectioners Workers, 315 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Pa. 1970). This case
was "disapproved" in Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.
1972). In view of Buffalo Forge's rejection of the Third Circuit's application of Boys
Markets, the Stroehmann doctrine may be revived. See Note, The Applicability of Boys
Markets Injunctions to Refusals to Cross a Picket Line, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 113, 122
n.73 (1976).
98. 96 S. Ct. at 3143-44.
99. 386 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
100. 517 F.2d 1207 (2nd Cir. 1975).
101. Justice White was joined in his decision by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist.
102. 96 S. Ct. at 3146.
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were found to be violated. 1°3 The only question for resolution by the
Court was whether an injunction could issue pending the arbitrator's
decision on the right of the union to honor its sister union's picket
line.10
4
This question obviously turns upon the applicability of Boys
Markets and the policies underlying it. The Buffalo Forge majority
found
[t]he driving force behind Boys Markets [to be the implementation
of] the strong congressional preference for the private dispute settle-
ment mechanisms agreed upon by the parties. Only to that extent
was it held necessary to accommodate section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act .... 105
Since a sympathy strike did not interfere with the mechanism of arbitra-
tion, the Court reasoned that Boys Markets did not apply.'00
Thus the Court limited the "narrow" Boys Markets exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to situations in which the injunction was
necessary to protect the function of the arbitrator. Even if the
sympathy strike is in clear contravention of a no-strike clause, no in-
junction could issue solely for that reason because to do so would be
a circumvention of congressional intent: "In the course of enacting the
Taft-Hartley Act, Congress rejected the proposal that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's prohibition . . . be lifted to the extent necessary to
make injunctive remedies available in federal courts for the purpose
of enforcing collective bargaining agreements."' 0 7 Only the effectuation
of the congressional preference for the process of arbitration justified
negating this legislative rejection of the injunctive remedy. The require-
ment of Boys Markets that the strike be over an arbitrable dis-
pute is thus the outer limit to the erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
absent further congressional action. Implicitly adopting the Amstar
argument,10 8 the Court stated that Boys Markets must be the limit to
the accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, because otherwise "a
court [could] enjoin any . . . alleged breach of contract pending the
exhaustion of applicable grievance and arbitration provisions even
103. Id. at 3148.
104. Id. at 3146.
105. Id. at 3147 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3148.
108. See text accompanying notes 93 & 94 supra.
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though the injunction would otherwise violate one of the express pro-
hibitions of § 104."109
As a further basis for its decision, the Buffalo Forge Court noted
that if the district courts were to get into the business of issuing pre-
liminary injunctions for no-strike clause violations, such action, besides
contravening congressional will, could place an intolerable burden upon
the district courts. This "floodgates" argument was buttressed by the
statement that "[t]he parties have agreed to grieve and arbitrate, not
to litigate . . they have not contracted for a judicial preview of the
facts and the law.""n0 The agreement to arbitrate would be frustrated
if the courts could decide contractual questions in preliminary injunc-
tion litigation because the arbitrator would probably
be heavily influenced or wholly preempted by judicial views of
the facts and the meaning of contracts if this procedure is per-
mitted. Injunctions against strikes, even temporary injunctions,
very often permanently settle the issue; and in other contexts time
and expense would be discouraging factors to the losing party in
court in considering whether to relitigate the issue before the
arbitrator.":'
The Court neglected to mention that in Gateway Coal the agree-
ment to arbitrate was frustrated in just this manner. The majority,
however, distinguished Gateway Coal by stating that the Court's entry
into the area of contractual interpretation was "only preparatory to find-
ing an implied duty not to strike.""12  Further, the Court emphasized
that the Gateway Coal strike was "enjoined only because it was over
an arbitrable dispute." 1 3
In short, the Court held in Buffalo Forge that only the congres-
sional preference for the arbitration device as a method for resolving
industrial disputes justifies an injunction in contravention of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. If the arbitration process is not threatened by the
109. 96 S. Ct. at 3148.
110. Id. at 3149 (footnote omitted). The Court went further and held as a matter
of law that a no-strike clause, standing alone, does not imply that the union has agreed
not to go out on a sympathy strike: "The strike had neither the purpose nor the effect
of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving the employer of his bar-
gain." Id. at 3147 (emphasis added). Only by defining the no-strike clause so as not
to cover the sympathy strike can the Court make such a statement.
The Court also held that while a mandatory arbitration clause may imply a coexten-
sive no-strike pledge under the doctrine of Gateway Coal, it does not imply a duty not
to engage in sympathy strikes. Id. at 3147 n.10. The dissent concurred in this holding.
Id. at 3155 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 3149.
112. Id. at 3147 n.10.
113. Id.
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strike and the strike is not an attempt by the union to pressure the em-
ployer for concessions on the arbitrable issue itself, then this preference
is not violated. The Boys Markets requirement that the strike be "over"
an arbitrable grievance is thus unquestionably reaffirmed, for without
this essential ingredient, no matter how clearly the strike violates the
union's freely bargained for obligation not to strike, the strike will not
interfere with the arbitrator's function in deciding its legality.114
VII. THE BUFFALO FORGE DISSENT
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens questioned the majority's
result by interpreting the interests protected by Boys Markets in a fun-
damentally different way. Rather than focusing on the protection of
the arbitration process, Justice Stevens stressed the importance of an
injunction's effect on the expected result of arbitration when a clear
violation of a no-strike clause occurs." 5 The end as well as the means
were to be protected by Boys Markets. The dissent reasoned that only
by giving an employer" 'assurance of uninterrupted operation during the
term of the agreement' " could the "more basic policy of motivating
employers to agree to binding arbitration" be achieved. 11
114. In one of the first circuit court cases to construe Buffalo Forge, a judge appar-
ently misconstrued its requirements. Judge Garth's concurring opinion in United States
Steel Corp. v. UMW, 548 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1976) (Garth, J., concurring), contains this
statement: "When a contract [which expressly forbids sympathy strikes] is in force, the
reasoning of Buffalo Forge clearly suggests that the legality of a sympathy strike would
be immediately arbitrable and that such a strike could be enjoined pending the outcome
of the arbitration." Id. at 75. Such an interpretation cannot stand in view of the
Court's statement in Buffalo Forge that "aside from the enforcement of the arbitration
provisions of [collective bargaining] contracts, within the limits permitted by Boys
Markets, the Court has never indicated that the courts may enjoin actual or threatened
contract violations despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 96 S. Ct. at 3148 (emphasis
added). In the situation described by Judge Garth, the sympathy strike is no more
"over" an arbitrable issue than in Buffalo Forge, and thus no injunction may issue.
The only possible basis for Judge Garth's conclusions lies in the Court's statement
in Buffalo Forge that the sympathy strike does not deprive the employer "of his bar-
gain." Id. at 3147. If the bargain between the parties clearly and unequivocally con-
tains the obligation not to go out on sympathy strike, then such a strike would deprive
management of its bargain. Assuming, however, the employer is aware of national labor
law and the absence of the injunctive remedy for violations of contract that are not
"over" an arbitrable grievance, a violation of a pledge that specifically contains sym-
pathy strikes would not deprive him of his bargain. He knows beforehand that he can
get damages but no injunction. The state of the law after Buffalo Forge is simply that
an employer cannot assure continued production through an injunction.
115. 96 S. Ct. at 3158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 3155 (quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
454 (1957)).
117. Id. There is some support for the minority characterization of the policy of
inducing employers to sign arbitration agreements as "more basic" than the policy of
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In so identifying the "basic policy" to be effectuated, the dissent
has rendered its opinion superficially consistent in internal reasoning.
Since the dissent sees the basic policy of the federal common law of
labor to be the encouragement of arbitration as a means to the desired
end of reducing industrial strife, it follows that the sympathy strike
should be enjoined. The problem with this position is that Congress
has yet to adopt it, and in fact seems to have expressly negated it in
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.118 However desirable the dis-
sent feels it is to minimize industrial strife and hold unions to their
bargains, the Norris-LaGuardia Act remains on the books, and it specif-
ically prohibits injunctions in labor disputes to force employees back
to work.
In dealing with the issue of congressional intent, the dissent
reached a result contrary to that of the majority through another differ-
ence in emphasis. While the majority stressed the legislative history
of the Taft-Hartley Act to negate any implied rejection of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provisions," 9 the dissent keyed on the
purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act-to foster the growth and viabil-
ity of labor organizations.' 20  The dissent argued that since Buffalo
Forge "deals with the enforceability of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment rather than with the process by which such agreements are nego-
tiated and formed," the "central concerns" of the Act are not implicated
and thus the anti-injunction prohibition is inapplicable.' 2 ' Therefore,
in this situation there was "no policy justification for restricting §
301(a) to damage suits.' 22  To effectuate the basic policy of the
federal common law of labor, the dissent would allow an injunction
to issue to end a sympathy strike "if the agreement were so plainly
unambiguous that there could be no bona fide issue to submit to the
arbitrator.' 123
protecting the arbitral process. See text accompanying notes 72 & 73 supra. However,
as noted in the text accompanying notes 137-144 infra, this "more basic" policy conflicts
with the presumption in favor of the "central institution in the administration of collec-
tive bargaining contracts"-arbitration. Wellington & Albert, supra note 72, at 1557,
quoted with approval in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 252 (1970).
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970) which provides in part: "No court of the
United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . injunction in any case involving
or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person. . . interested in such dispute
. . . from.. . [c]easing or refusing to perform any work ..
119. 96 S. Ct. at 3148.
120. Id. at 3152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3154.
123. Id. at 3156.
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In approving the injunctive remedy in Buffalo Forge the dissent
was mindful of some restraint imposed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
and therefore proposed stringent conditions:
[N]o injunction or temporary restraining order should issue with-
out first giving the union an adequate opportunity to present evi-
dence and argument, particularly upon the proper interpretation of
the collective-bargaining agreement; the judge should not issue an
injunction without convincing evidence that the strike is clearly
within the no-strike clause. Furthermore, to protect the efficacy
of arbitration, any such injunction should require the parties to
submit the issue immediately to the contractual grievance proce-
dure, and if the union so requests, at the last stage and upon an
expedited schedule that assures a decision by the arbitrator as
soon as practicable.1 24
There are several problems with the analysis used by the dissent.
The most important and the most difficult to overcome is the manner
in which it dealt with the majority's congressional intent argument. In
Boys Markets, the Court arguably took its "most ambitious foray into
an area seemingly pre-empted by statute."'1 25  For the dissent to dis-
pose of the majority's congressional intent argument against the exten-
sion of Boys Markets by merely noting that the majority cited the
reasoning of an overruled opinion 126 seems to sidestep the issue. Sin-
clair was indeed overruled in Boys Markets, but on narrow grounds. 127
The core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act-to foster the growth
and viability of organized labor' 28-was not implicated in Boys Markets
because the union there was already established and under contract.
The union's viability was not in doubt, and thus the Act was ripe for
accommodation.
In Buffalo Forge, on the other hand, the policy of the Act was
indeed involved. The 0 & T employees were picketing in an attempt
to use traditional union solidarity in their struggle with their em-
124. Id. at 3158-59. Justice Stevens also added:
Such stringent conditions would insure that only strikes in violation of the
agreement would be enjoined and that the union's access to the arbitration
process would not be foreclosed by the combined effect of a temporary injunc-
tion and protected [sic] grievance procedures. Finally, as in Boys Mark.ts,
the normal conditions of equitable relief would have to be met.
Id. at 3159.
125. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 334
(3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
126. 96 S. Ct. at 3154 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 209-10 (1962)).
127. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.




ployer.12' The 0 & T picket line was protected by statute and no in-
junction could issue against their strike because of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.'30 To force the P & M employees back to work impinges
upon the "growth and viability" of the 0 & T employees' union because
it removes part of their leverage against management. Thus the poli-
cies underlying the Norris-LaGuardia Act are implicated, albeit indi-
rectly.
The dissent completely ignored the interests of the 0 & T
employees when it discounted the significance of an erroneously issued
injunction ending a legal sympathy strike. Justice Stevens merely
noted that the sympathy strike did nothing to further the economic inter-
ests of the P & M employees.'' Since the P & M employees' economic
interests were not at stake, the minority implied that it was more impor-
tant to the public interest to erroneously enjoin the sympathy strike than
to erroneously allow them to strike.'3 2  This position completely ig-
nores the preference expressed by Congress that unions be protected.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not by its terms seek to protect only
the union against which the injunction is sought. Thus, in the sympathy
strike context, the political preference for unions expressed in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act comes into play, and the rationale of Boys
Markets for dispensing with that preference when the union is estab-
lished and under contract does not apply.
Although the dissent's treatment of the congressional intent argu-
ment seems inadequate when viewed in light of the limited accommoda-
tion made in Boys Markets, the more extensive accommodation made in
the Railway Labor Act cases offers some support for the position that a
further erosion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is permissible even when
the latter Act's policies are implicated. As previously noted, the Court
progressed in the Railway Labor cases from allowing a district court to
enjoin a strike only when a reasonable alternative to that strike was
available to allowing such an injunction to issue solely because there
was no other adequate means of enforcing a statutory duty. The
Chicago and North Western Railway decision 33 provides support for
129. "It is almost a rule of trade union ethics for one labor union to respect a picket
line established by another." L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 868, 874
(1946).
130. See note 82 supra.
131. 96 S. Ct. at 3157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).,
132. Id. at 3158.
133. 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
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the dissents insistence upon the injunctive remedy as the only practical,
efficient means of enforcing the no-strike duty, even if the very purpose
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is involved.184  The contrary argument
that the accommodation made under the Railway Labor Act was made
to enforce a statutory rather than a contractual duty is amply dealt with
by citing the equivalence made in Boys Markets between the statutory
duty to arbitrate under the Railway Labor Act and the contractual duty
to arbitrate involved in that case. 185 Since damages have been held to
be an inadequate remedy for a breach of a no-strike clause, 186 the dis-
sent's conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be accom-
modated follows logically from the Railway Labor Act cases.
Even conceding the dissent's consistency with the Railway Labor
Act cases does not save its analysis, because it conflicts with a funda-
mental policy of the federal common law of labor-the presumption
in favor of arbitrability.1 7  Justice Stevens would allow an injunction
only if the scope of the no-strike clause is clearly an arbitrable issue. 18
This restriction was imposed to promote the "basic policy" of inducing
employers to sign arbitration clauses. If an employer could obtain an
injunction to halt a sympathy strike only if the arbitration clause
"clearly" governed the applicability of the no-strike clause, then he
would be encouraged to sign a broad clause. Conversely, if an injunc-
tion could be obtained even if the arbitration clause were narrowly
drawn or absent, this "basic policy" would not be furthered. 80 Thus,
to effectuate the "basic policy" of encouraging broad arbitration clauses,
the minority would limit the injunction to those situations in which the
arbitration clause "clearly" covers the issue of the sympathy strike's
134. Id. at 583.
135. 398 U.S. at 252.
136. Id. at 253; accord, William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417
U.S. 12, 19 (1974); Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381 n.14 (1974).
But see note 77 supra.
137. See notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
138. It is not necessary to hold that an injunction may issue if the scope of
the no-strike clause is not a clearly arbitrable issue. If the agreement contains
no arbitration clause whatsoever, enforcement of the no-strike clause would not
promote arbitration by encouraging employers to agree to an arbitration clause
in exchange for a no-strike clause. Furthermore, even if the agreement con-
tains an arbitration clause, but the clause does not clearly extend to the ques-
tion whether a strike violates the agreement, then the parties' commitment to
enforcement of the no-strike clause through enforcement of the arbitrator's
final decision also remains unclear.
96 S. Ct. at 3156 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. In. fact, to grant an injunction when there is no arbitration clause, or when
the scope of the clause is unclear would induce employers to sign narrow clauses, or
induce them to sign no arbitration clauses at all.
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legality. Such a limitation necessitates a presumption against the
arbitrability of the scope of the no-strike clause. Under such reasoning
the dissent should find that the injunction in Gateway Coal was improvi-
dently granted, for in that case it was far from "clear" that the union
had agreed to arbitrate the safety dispute.140 However, instead of re-
jecting Gateway Coal, the dissent relied upon it to justify an injunction
in Buffalo Forge. Indeed, the dissent cited with approval the extension
of Boys Markets made in Gateway Coal to authorize an injunction en-
forcing a no-strike clause "in a case in which the question of arbitrabil-
ity was itself a 'substantial question of contractual interpretation.' "141
Obviously, there is an inconsistency in relying on a case in which the
presumption in favor of arbitrability was applied with a vengeance
while at the same time developing what amounts to a presumption
against arbitrability in order to effectuate the basic policy of inducing
employers to agree to broad arbitration clauses. 42
This inconsistency cuts to the heart of the dissent's position. If
enjoining sympathy strikes is to be justified in spite of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act on the basis of motivating employers to agree to binding
arbitration, then it is necessary to apply a presumption against arbitra-
bility in order to encourage expansive arbitration clauses. To give the
employer the assurance of a continuous work force when the arbitration
clause does not cover the issue of the strike's legality would do nothing
to motivate employers to sign expansive clauses. Therefore, if the pre-
sumption of arbitrability were to apply here as in other cases, the dis-
sent's position would fail to accomplish its desired result, and there
would be no justification for an accommodation of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. Since there is no indication that the strong reaffirmation
given the presumption of arbitrability in Gateway Coal4 ' is questioned
by the dissent (indeed, Buffalo Forge dissenter Justice Powell authored
Gateway Coal)14 4 the implied presumption against arbitrability cannot
stand, and thus the analysis fails.
140. See note 86 supra.
141. 96 S. Ct. at 3155 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See generally Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of
Arbitrability, 85 H,v. L. REv. 636 (1972), for a good discussion of the presumption
of arbitrability as applied to the Boys Markets injunction.
143. See note 86 supra.
144. In Gateway Coal, Justice Powell stated that "[tihe strong federal policy favor-
ing arbitration of labor disputes was the lynchpin of this Court's reasoning in Boys Mar-
kets." 414 U.S. at 381-382. Although the minority still ostensibly favors arbitration,
its limitation on the scope of the arbitration clause concerning no-strike clauses cuts
against this preference.
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Although the dissenting opinion is logically inconsistent, it validly
highlights an undesirable effect of the majority's opinion. Boys Mar-
kets was at least partly predicated on the desire to produce a uni-
formity of result in the state and federal systems and to cut down on
removal from the former to the latter.145 To effectuate this result, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was accommodated to provide federal judges
with the same remedies as state judges. Now, in Buffalo Forge, the
same problem that was solved in Boys Markets will be revived-state
courts and federal courts will have different remedies for sympathy
strikes in violation of contract. 14 6 Although the scope of the problem
probably will not be as great as the one remedied in Boys Markets,'147
it remains as a blemish upon a decision that is otherwise consistent with
national labor law policy.
In addition, the Buffalo Forge decision has the anomalous conse-
quence of providing injunctive relief to an employer who violates the
collective bargaining agreement while denying an injunction to the con-
tract abiding employer. 48 When a union strikes because of a deter-
mination that its employer has violated the agreement, Boys Markets
authorizes an injunction if there is an arbitration clause which governs
the legality of the employer's actions. Thus the employer who antici-
pates a sympathy strike will have an incentive to breach the contract
shortly before the first pickets are set up, and thereby create the im-
pression that the strike is not really for reasons of union solidarity, but
rather in response to the employer's illegal action. On the other hand,
if the employer honors his contract even though he expects to be shut
down by a sympathy strike, Buffalo Forge prohibits an injunction. Of
course, the district court can make a factual determination of the true
cause of the strike, but the mere possibility that a court would find the
cause to be "over" an arbitrable dispute may induce some employers
to breach.' 49
145. See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
146. Of course, to the extent that Buffalo Forge changes the substantive law of con-
tract interpretation, see note 110 supra, the state courts are bound. Teamsters Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
147. One third of all strikes annually are breach of contract strikes. U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR BULL. No. 1777, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES
1971, at 5, 23-24 (1974).
148. Brief for NAM as Amicus Curiae at 3, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
149. The employer tried this very tactic unsuccessfully in Latrobe Steel Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1341 n.22 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Finally, if there is more than one local at a plant, as was the situa-
tion at Buffalo Forge, the international could whipsaw an employer
through the use of staggered termination dates and shut down the entire
plant when either local bargains to impasse with the employer. 150 Ob-
viously, the employer should strive for contracts with coterminus
termination dates.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Buffalo Forge decision is an exercise in judicial restraint. Al-
though the competing policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of
enjoining strikes that violate collective bargaining contracts, the Court
has refrained from acting upon these considerations in deference to the
expressed will of Congress. Fashioning its decision within the congres-
sional policy against labor injunctions, the Court attempted to justify its
result by defining the union's no-strike pledge not to include the duty
to cross another union's picket line. However inadequate this rationale
may be, it is not the task of the Court to justify the acts of Congress,
but merely to implement them.
The Court has given the signal to Congress that the accommoda-
tion of the anti-injunction provisions of the national labor law is at an
end. Congress should, and may yet, decide that a union should be re-
quired to honor its commitment not to strike. But until Congress does
so, under Buffalo Forge the Norris-LaGuardia Act will retain at least
some of its vitality.
PHILIP P. W. YATES
150. Brief for Associated Industries of New York as Amicus Curiae at 11, Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
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